Oil, Gas and Mineral Law by Brown, Richard F.
SMU Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 21
2005
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
Richard F. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 58 SMU L. Rev. 1005 (2005)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol58/iss3/21
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
Richard F. Brown*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1005
II. CONVEYANCING ....................................... 1005
A. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION .............................. 1005
B. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS ................................ 1007
III. LEASES AND LEASING ................................ 1010
A . PARTIES ............................................... 1010
B. ROYALTY CLAUSE .................................... 1011
C. POOLING CLAUSE ..................................... 1011
D . D RAINAGE ............................................ 1015
E. TERMINATION ......................................... 1016
F. SURFACE RIGHTS ..................................... 1021
IV. OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND OPERATIONS .... 1022
A. OPERATING AGREEMENTS ............................. 1022
B. O PERATIONS .......................................... 1027
V . SE ISM IC ................................................. 1029
VI. M ARKETING ............................................ 1030
VII. RAILROAD COMMISSION ............................. 1033
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2003
through November 1, 2004. The cases examined include decisions




Sunwest Operating Co. v. Classic Oil & Gas, Inc. 2 construes a typical
multi-property conveyance afflicted with the common problem of incon-
sistencies and uncertainties between the text of the conveyance and the
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. 303 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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property descriptions on Exhibit A. It is a common practice in the indus-
try to draft a conveyance of "Leases," "Lands" and "Contracts," with the
Leases and Lands described on an attached Exhibit A. Limitations on
the grant are sometimes found in the text of the conveyance and some-
times in Exhibit A, and sometimes the two are hard to reconcile.
In this case, two oil and gas leases were pooled into the Velma Daniels
Gas Unit. A portion of each of the two leases was expressly excluded
from the gas unit ("Excluded Acreage"). Sunwest, claiming under the
disputed assignment, sought a declaratory judgment that it owned the Ex-
cluded Acreage. According to Sunwest, the assignment conveyed all of
the working interest in the land covered by the leases, including the Ex-
cluded Acreage. 3
The form of assignment in question provided in the Recitals:
1. Assignor owns an interest in the oil and gas leases described on
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof (the
"Leases") which pertain to the Lands described in Exhibit A
(the "Lands"). . . .The Leases, Lands, Equipment, Contracts,
Production and Data are all collectively referred to as the
"Properties."
6. Assignor agrees to assign all right, title and interest of Assignor
in and to the Properties to assignee in order to vest Assignee
with title in and to the Properties. 4
The granting clause conveyed "all of Assignor's right, title and interest,
including any and all overriding royalty interest, in and to the Proper-
ties."'5 The attached Exhibit A described the unit in question as follows:
BECKVILLE
Panola County, Tecas [sic]
VELMA DANIELS GAS UNIT NO. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Seller's interest
in and to acreage allocated to the Velma Daniels Gas Unit No. 1,
more particularly described as 641.76 acres, more or less,... more
particularly described in Gas Unit Designation for the Velma Dan-
iels No. 1, a counterpart of which is recorded in .... 6
Thirteen oil and gas leases are then scheduled by the usual reference to
recording data and acreage covered by each. The two leases in question
are recited as covering a specific number of acres, which was equal to the
original leased acreage; that is, all the acreage including the Excluded
Acreage. 7 There is another provision in Exhibit A which provides as
follows:
The above-described interests are subject to all valid, existing instru-
ments of record affecting same and to all applicable unrecorded let-
3. Id. at 829-30.
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ter agreements, operating agreements, gas purchase contracts and
other agreements relative to the marketing of production from said
lands.8
The court analyzed the assignment utilizing the "four corners" rule of
construction. Sunwest argued that the "Properties," as defined in the re-
citals, included all of the acreage contained in the leases, including the
Excluded Acreage. The property description on Exhibit A conveyed the
assignor's "interest in and to acreage allocated to the Velma Daniels Gas
Unit," but also listed the tracts of land covered by the leases in their en-
tirety. The court held that the assignment conveyed only the portions of
the leases that were included in the Velma Daniels Gas Unit.9
The court pointed to the fact that none of the gas units described in the
assignment referenced any portion of the two leases. The interest con-
veyed was acreage in the unit. The court also noted that Sunwest's inter-
pretation of the term "Properties" was overly broad because the language
of the assignment itself limited the "conveyance to the interest in the oil
and gas leases which pertain to the lands described in Exhibit A." 10 Ex-
hibit A also provides that the interests conveyed "are subject to" all valid
instruments of record."1 The record showed the designation of unit for
the Velma Daniels Gas Unit and the acreage included in it, but the record
did not indicate that the Excluded Acreage was part of any oil or gas
units described in the assignment. Therefore, Sunwest did not own an
interest in the Excluded Acreage. 12
B. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS
The case of McMillan v. Dooley13 deals with the continuing problem
associated with the exercise of a preferential right to purchase a portion
of the properties in a package sale. This case follows a typical fact pattern
of an exchange of letters or communications between seller/potential
buyer and the holder of the preferential right involving notice of the sale,
presentment of the terms, exercise of the right, and then a controversy
over whether the right was validly and timely exercised. In this particular
case, the seller failed to give the required notice of sale to the holder of
the preferential right, Dooley, and seller closed with the buyer, McMillen.
Dooley found out about the sale almost immediately and telephoned the
buyer McMillan. McMillan made an oral offer during this conversation
to sell the entire package to Dooley, but Dooley declined the package
because he wanted only the Dooley lease. There was an exchange of let-
ters over the next several months. After approximately two years,
Dooley sued and asked the court to fix the price for the Dooley lease and
8. Id. at 833 (emphasis deleted).
9. Id. at 831-32.
10. Id. at 833 (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 834 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 834-35.
13. 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. filed).
100720051
SMU LAW REVIEW
for damages for bad faith trespass. 14
The court did not expend any analysis on the original failure to give
notice. Instead, the court simply cited existing authority for the general
principles that when there is a failure to give notice, the buyer takes sub-
ject to the rightholder's option; when the rightholder learns of the con-
veyance, the rightholder has the opportunity to accept or reject within the
specified time frame just as if the notice was then properly given, and the
continuing option is not perpetual. The rightholder must choose between
exercising the right or acquiescing in the transfer.'
5
Notice that a sale has occurred does not necessarily mean that the no-
tice required by the preferential right has been given, nor does it necessa-
rily define the terms of sale. The court must construe the language
creating the preferential right to purchase. 16 Most of the opinion is de-
voted to an analysis of whether or not the rightholder (Dooley in this
case) was obligated to purchase the entire package to claim the limited
interest subject to the right, the adequacy of a presentment in the context
of a package sale and under the specific facts of this sale, and the obliga-
tion to exercise the right or lose it. The court cited Hinds v. Madison for
the proposition that the holder of a right on a part of a ranch could not
expand that right to include all of the ranch then being sold.17 The court
stated, "[i]f a rightholder is not permitted to expand his preferential
purchase right to include property not covered by the provision, it would
be improper for him to be required to accept other property not covered
by his preferential purchase right in order to exercise his right."'18
Preferential rights agreements are broadly split into two categories: (1)
"price" agreements, in which the exercise price is fixed; and (2) "terms
and conditions agreements," under which the rightholder must meet the
terms and conditions negotiated by seller and buyer. The latter are far
more common and more troublesome. In this case, the preferential right
provision reserved the right to purchase the lease, required notice of the
highest bona fide price offered, and gave the holder ten days to accept or
lose the right.19 The court followed the frequently cited opinion of West
Texas Transmission, L.P. v. Enron Corp.20 for the general proposition
that the seller is free to strike its best deal and to require the rightholder
to match that bargain, subject only to any restrictions found in the reser-
vation of the right. The court rejected Dooley's claim that his reservation
restricted McMillan's right to make his best deal.21
14. Id. at 164-69.
15. Id. at 172.
16. Id. at 175.
17. Id. at 179 (citing Hinds v. Madison, 424 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id. at 175 (citing W. Tex. Transmission, L.P. v. Enron Corp., 907 F.2d 1554, 1562-63
(5th Cir. 1990)).
21. Id. at 175-76.
[Vol. 581008
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
As to the adequacy of the presentment, West Texas Transmission has
been cited for the premise that the seller is free to impose conditions on
the sale,
as long as those conditions are commercially reasonable, imposed in
good faith, and not specifically designed to defeat the [preferential
purchase] rights. Where the owner meets these three standards, the
holder of the [preferential purchase] right ... lacks grounds to re-
move specific conditions from the contract, or to extract other con-
cessions as part of the agreement. 22
In this case, Dooley obtained favorable findings that effectively tracked
these criteria, but the court distinguished West Texas Transmission and
noted that other courts have been critical of the decision. 23 The court
held that these factors more appropriately relate to the right to object to
sale conditions not expressly prohibited by the preferential purchase pro-
vision and to the manner in which the rightholder may respond in order
to exercise the right. As to the presentment itself, the court followed the
more mechanical approach of Koch Industries, Inc. v. Sun Co.2 4 Under
Texas law, absent some other express contractual provision, the seller has
an initial duty to make a reasonable disclosure of the offer's terms, the
rightholder has a subsequent duty to undertake a reasonable investiga-
tion of any terms unclear to him, and the rightholder does not have a duty
to act in order to exercise his preferential right unless and until he re-
ceives a reasonable disclosure of the terms of the contemplated convey-
ance.25 A sufficient presentment may be made, from a mechanical
perspective, if there is a reasonable disclosure of the terms; the court
found that one of McMillan's letters conclusively established that a rea-
sonable disclosure of the terms of the conveyance was made to Dooley.2 6
Although the purchaser of property subject to a preferential purchase
right takes the property subject to that right and the holder of that right
can enforce its option to acquire the property, the holder must do so
within the specified time frame, in accordance with the terms of the
right.2 7 The rightholder's duty to act is an affirmative duty and the failure
to act is tantamount to a rejection of the opportunity to exercise the right.
The court found that Dooley was not required to accept the package with
the other leases, but he was required to timely act. In fact, he timely
rejected the package deal and then did nothing until the time to act had
expired. The court suggested that the proper response should have been
an exercise of the right, subject to objections to disputed terms.2 8
22. W. Tex. Transmission, 907 F.2d at 1563.
23. McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 177 (citing Abraham Inv. Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc., 968
S.W.2d 518, 526-27 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied)); Tex. State Optical, Inc. v.
Wiggins, 882 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
24. 918 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
25. McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 174 (citing Koch Indus., Inc., 918 F.2d at 1211-12).
26. Id. at 176-77; see Comeaux v. Suderman, 93 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
27. McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 172.
28. Id. at 181; see Tex. State Optical, 882 S.W.2d at 11.
2005] 1009
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Although Dooley was not required to purchase all of the leases to exer-
cise his option, he still had to take steps to preserve his right.2 9 Because
Dooley responded in the specified time period that he wished to decline
the offer, he had no right thereafter to exercise that option.30
There was another lease in the same package sale subject to a preferen-
tial right in favor of Johnson. The parties to the package sale assigned no
value to the Johnson lease, and the court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment that Johnson was entitled to specific performance whereby he ob-
tained ownership of the Johnson lease free of cost.31
III. LEASES AND LEASING
A. PARTIES
Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co. ,32 holds that a life tenant could grant oil
and gas leases that extended beyond the life tenant's lifetime. The will
granted a life estate to testator's wife and provided the following:
It is my desire and I direct, that, Carrie T. Maddox, my wife, shall
have fully power and authority and the same is hereby granted to her
to, manage, control and lease for all purposes the real and personal
estate herein after bequeathed during her life time and to extract
therefrom all oil, gas and or other minerals during said period of her
life estate as limited herein, and the further power and authority to
manage and control jointly with her estate, all other property, collect
and have the rents and revenues arising from the entire estate during
the period of her life and she remaining unmarried after my death.33
Although a life tenant ordinarily cannot convey an estate that is greater
than one tied to her life, the instrument conveying the life estate can con-
fer greater powers upon the life tenant. Thus, a testator or grantor can
give the life tenant power to execute oil and gas leases that extend be-
yond the life tenant's own lifetime. 34 The question is one of intent.
In Steger, the plain meaning of the words in the will showed testator's
intention to give the life tenants the power to execute oil and gas leases
that extended beyond the life tenants' lifetimes. The time limits placed
on the authority to lease (lifetime) did not limit the type of lease which
could be executed. 35 The court also noted that the power to extract oil,
gas, and other minerals, which testator expressly gave to the life tenants,
is a power to dispose of the corpus. Under this will, the life tenants could
dispose of all the oil and gas during their lifetime, which necessarily in-
cludes the power to execute oil and gas leases that extended beyond their
29. McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 180.
30. Id. at 180-81.
31. Id. at 188.
32. 134 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 364.
34. Id. at 373.
35. Id. at 374.
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lifetimes.36
B. ROYALTY CLAUSE
Santa Fe Snyder Corp. v. Norton37 holds that the Deep Water Royalty
Relief Act of 1995 ("RRA") unambiguously granted royalty suspension
for new leases. The Department of Interior ("Department") promul-
gated regulations for the administration of the RRA that granted royalty
suspension only if the new lease was determined to be in a field that had
not produced prior to the enactment of the RRA. Section 302 of the
RRA governs royalty relief for existing leases while sections 303 and 304
provide royalty relief for new leases. 38
Shell Offshore successfully bid for a lease that qualified as a "new
lease" under the RRA. Shell then executed the lease which mirrored the
terms of the notice of sale and the Interior Department regulations. Spe-
cifically, the lease stated, among other things, that a royalty suspension
would only be available if the lease was "in a field where no currently
active lease produced oil or gas" before the enactment of the RRA, and
that the royalty suspension, if any, would apply to the field where the
lease was located, not to the particular lease.39 Once drilled, the well was
assigned by the Department to a field that contained leases that had pro-
duced prior to the enactment of the RRA, thus excluding the well from
the benefit of royalty suspension. Shell then filed suit challenging the
Department's interpretation of the RRA as set forth in the regulations
promulgated by the Interior Department.40
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that section 304
mandates that, without exception, based solely on various objective fac-
tors (water depth, location of lease, and date of sale), all leases that meet
the objective criteria are entitled to the benefit of royalty suspension.41
C. POOLING CLAUSE
In Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. v. W. L. Ranch, Inc.,42 the court
considered the relationship between a partial release ("Pugh") clause and
a pooling clause in a lease and found the pooling clause to be controlling.
The W.L. Ranch lease had a primary term of one year and so long there-
after as "operations" were conducted upon "said land." The lease also
authorized pooling and, if pooled, "operations" on the pooled unit would
extend the primary term. Prior to the expiration of the primary term, the
leased acreage was pooled to form a 378-acre unit, and Pioneer com-
menced drilling a horizontal well. However, the wellbore did not pene-
36. Id. at 375.
37. 385 F.3d 884 (5th Cir. 2004).
38. Id. at 888-89 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C), (a)(1)(H) (2004)).
39. Id. at 890.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 893-94.
42. 127 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
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trate the W.L. Ranch lease until after the primary term expired. The well
was eventually plugged and abandoned. 43
W.L. Ranch brought an action against Pioneer for trespass, negligence
and fraud, alleging that Pioneer drilled the well across its property after
expiration of the lease. Although the lease had clearly been pooled and
operations had clearly commenced before the expiration of the primary
term, the lease had a partial release clause in the Addendum which read
as follows:
If at the expiration of the Primary term or any time thereafter, oil or
gas is not being produced in paying quantities from the lease prem-
ises, or Lessee is not then engaged in the actual drilling operations
on the lease premises, this lease shall terminate as to all lands and
horizons covered hereby. Lessee shall maintain the lease with re-
spect to producing acreage at the end of the primary term from the
surface to a depth of 100 feet below the stratigraphic equivalent of
the deepest productive formation in any well pooled with or drilled
on the 103.75 acres during the primary term.44
This lease also provided that in the event of a conflict between the
Addendum and the lease, the Addendum would control.45 W.L. Ranch
argued that the Addendum refers only to "lease premises," not to unit-
ized or pooled lands, and because there were no timely operations on the
"lease premises," the lease terminated. 46 The trial court entered a partial
summary judgment and held that the lease had terminated. 47
The court of appeals reversed, noting that the Addendum included a
reference to production from "any well pooled with or drilled" on the
leased acreage. 48 Therefore, the court found from the Addendum itself
that the parties did not intend to eliminate pooling from the lease.4 9
More importantly, the court relied upon a presumption as to produc-
tion from the Southland Royalty case:
One of the legal consequences of a unitized lease as between the
lessor and lessee, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary,
[sic] the life of the lease is extended as to all included tracts beyond
the primary term and for as long as oil, gas or other minerals are
produced from any one of the tracts included in the lease, with each
lessor relinquishing his right to have his own tract separately
developed. 50
In the W.L. Ranch lease, the parties agreed to a unitized lease without an
express agreement that the lease could not be extended by commence-
43. Id. at 904-05.
44. Id. at 905 n.6.
45. Id. at 905 n.7.
46. Id. at 905.
47. Id. at 904.
48. Id. at 906 (emphasis deleted).
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1952)).
1012 (Vol. 58
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
ment of operations or production on land other than from the ranch. The
court extended the presumption arising out of a pooling clause (as ex-
pressed in Southland Royalty as to production) to hold that unit opera-
tions, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, will hold the
lease.51 The court then held that the partial release clause was not an
express agreement that the lease could not be extended by operations.
The court also held that even if there was a conflict between the two
provisions, it was not an irreconcilable conflict, and it is reasonable to
conclude that the parties intended to agree to the pooling which was ef-
fected by Pioneer. Therefore, the lease did not terminate upon the expi-
ration of the primary term, and drilling operations commenced on the
unit effectively extended the primary term of the lease by virtue of the
pooling of the lease with the other leases in the unit. 5
2
Union Gas Corp. v. Gisler53 is the first of seven related cases consider-
ing the relationship between the lease pooling clause, the filing of the
designation of unit and the effect on the royalty obligation when lessee
files after the date of first production. The Gisler lease pooling clause
read as follows:
Lessee shall file for record in the appropriate records of the county
in which the leased premises are situated an instrument describing
and designating the pooled acreage as a pooled unit; and upon such
recordation the unit shall be effective as to all parties hereto, their
heirs, successors, and assigns, irrespective of whether or not the unit
is likewise effective as to all other owners of surface, mineral, royalty
or other rights in land included in such unit.54
The Gisler lease was the well-site tract. Production was obtained on
March 27, 2000, and the designation of unit was filed on August 7, 2000.
In the unit designation, Union stated that the designation would be effec-
tive from the date of first production. On August 30, 2000, Gisler sued
Union for all royalties from the date of first production until the August 7
recordation of the unit designation (Gisler also sued for bad faith pool-
ing, drainage, breach of implied covenants, fraud, negligence, conversion,
inter alia against Union). Union brought all of the other lessors of the
pooled leases into the suit, and the other lessors contended they were
entitled to share proportionately in all royalties from date of first produc-
tion.55 When the competing lessors began filing motions for partial sum-
mary judgment, after the suit had been on file for nine months (fourteen
months after the date of first production) and while Union paid no royal-
ties to anyone, Union belatedly interpled royalties of $1,313,327.38, at-
tributable to the time prior to August 7.56
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 129 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied).
54. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 148.
56. Id. at 148, 152.
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The various lessors won their contract claims under their separate
leases on summary judgment, the contract claims were severed, and mul-
tiple appeals resulted. In this part of the controversy, the Gisler's claims
for past due royalties were severed from their other claims, resulting in a
final judgment against Union for an amount equal to the interpled funds,
plus interest, and attorneys' fees in the amount of $250,000.00. 57 The
principal issue on this appeal was whether Gisler was entitled to one hun-
dred percent of royalties to the date of recordation of the unit designa-
tion. The court found no reason to depart from the settled principles
expressed in Browning Oil Co. Inc. v. Luecke.58 The lessee's authority to
pool is derived solely from the terms of the lease and the parties must
strictly comply with the terms of the lease. The lease provided that pool-
ing was effective upon "recordation," and therefore there was no pooling
until recordation. 59
Union's real problem was that six other lessors under pooled leases
with functionally identical pooling clauses were also seeking payment of
royalty from date of first production by summary judgment. Each of the
other lessors also prevailed on their claim, thus "doubling" the royalty
Union was obligated to pay. Union contended that the Gisler summary
judgment and the summary judgments on the six other motions were
facially contradictory. The court in this appeal held that absent express
authority, a lessee has no power to pool the lessor's interests with the
interests of others. Union did not pool Gisler in accordance with the
terms of the Gisler lease, so nothing Union did in the subsequent, unilat-
eral, unit designation could change Union's obligation to Gisler. The
judgments as to the other royalty owners were not part of this appeal. 60
Union argued that it should escape further liability because of its filing
in interpleader. The court refused to release Union because of Union's
unreasonable delay in filing, because Union itself created the predica-
ment, and because Union did not do equity by paying Gisler the amount
payable for production prior to August 7.61
Finally, the court rejected Union's argument that the trial court should
not have severed Gisler's other claims for bad faith pooling which could
result in either the invalidation of the unit or a reformation of the unit,
which would obviously affect the royalty rights of others before and after
August 7.62 The court found that Gisler's contract claim for royalty was
distinguishable from Gisler's tort claims, and the other royalty owners
had no tort claims, only their own contract claims. 63 In finding the multi-
ple claims were separable and distinct, the court relied heavily upon
57. Id. at 148-49.
58. Id. at 150-51 (discussing Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2000, pet. denied)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 151-52.
61. Id. at 153-54.
62. Id. at 155-56.
63. Id. at 155.
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Gisler's lease, which expressly provided that the contractual obligations
were independent and "irrespective of whether or not the unit is likewise
effective as to all other owners . . . included in such unit."'64 In finding
that the severance was proper, the court was probably influenced by the
fact that the court already knew what it was going to do with the pre-
August 7 severed claims of the other lessors.
Union Gas Corp. v. Tittizer65 was the second of the seven cases. The
trial court had granted Tittizer's motion to share pro rata in royalty prior
to August 7, thus effectively "doubling" Union's royalty obligation, be-
cause Gisler was entitled to all royalty prior to August 7. The court re-
versed this judgment and held that because the unit was not effectively
pooled under Gisler's lease until the recordation of the designation, there
was no unit production until that time. "[A]lthough there was production
from March 27 on the Gisler's lease, there was no producing well on the
pooled unit until August 7. ''66 Thus, the court held that the well-site lease
was determinative in resolving the date by which a leasehold well be-
comes a unit well.
The court clearly rejected the trial court's approach of reading each
lease in a vacuum, stating, "[W]e are also constrained to construe all of
the leases, Union's late recorded unit designation, and the interplay of
these instruments .... ,,67 The court continued, "We also agree with
Union that the legal construction of the various leases and unit designa-
tion should be consistent. '68
Union Gas Corp. v. Dornburg,69 the third case, reaches the same result.
The lease contained a recordation requirement and only slightly different
language than the clauses found in Gisler and Tittizer. Union Gas Corp.
v. Arnold, Union Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley Cemetery Society, Union
Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley Volunteer Fire Department, and Union Gas
Corp. v. Zion Lutheran Church of Mission Valley 70 are indistinguishable.
D. DRAINAGE
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton71 holds that expert witness testimony in a
drainage case was incompetent to prove damages. The lessor Helton
64. Id. at 150.
65. No. 13-01-735-CV, 2003 WL 22479980 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
66. Id. at *4.
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id. at *4.
69. Union Gas Corp. v. Dornburg, No. 13-01-736-CV, 2003 WL 22478716 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
70. Union Gas Corp. v. Arnold, No. 13-01-737-CV, 2003 WL 22478745 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.); Union Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley
Cemetery Soc'y, No. 13-01-738-CV, 2003 WL 22478757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct.
30, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.); Union Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley Volunteer Fire Dep't, No.
13-010-739-CV, 2003 WL 22478780 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.)
(mem. op.); and Union Gas Corp. v. Zion Lutheran Church, No. 13-01-740-CV, 2003 WL
22478927 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
71. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004).
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sued Kerr-McGee (its lessee, who was also the offset operator) for breach
of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. Helton's expert wit-
ness, Riley, presented testimony to establish the amount of gas a hypo-
thetical offset well would have produced, that a reasonably prudent
operator would have drilled the well, and the amount of royalties Helton
would have received. The trial court entered judgment for damages, in-
terest and attorneys' fees in an amount of $1,432,618.72
Riley testified that he looked at numerous accepted sources in forming
his opinion, including well logs, base maps, production information, rail-
road commission records, and scout cards. Riley opined that the hypo-
thetical offset would have produced at certain rates by reference to other
existing wells, and that as additional wells came on, the rate would have
declined at a certain rate.73 The court did not attempt to determine
whether Riley's opinion regarding the hypothetical well's productivity
was correct, but rather whether the analysis Riley used to reach his con-
clusions was reliable. Based on the record, the court concluded that his
opinion was not reliable because there was "too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion. '74 The court apparently accepted the
premise that data from existing wells may be considered in predicting a
hypothetical well's production, but rejected Riley's testimony because the
record did not show how Riley used that and other data to reach his con-
clusions in this case, and the record did not show why known differences
in the wells would not result in different production rates.75 The court
reversed and rendered. 76
E. TERMINATION
Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc. 77 is an important case on the
temporary cessation of production ("TCOP") doctrine, lease surrender
and assignment clauses, lease termination by cessation of production and
relationships between owners of divided interests in the leasehold. It is
probably the most important case decided during the Survey period.
The 1937 lease at issue covered two tracts of land. The leasehold in
one tract was owned by Guinn, while the other was owned by Ridge.
Although there had been no production on the Guinn tract since 1950,
the lease stayed in effect during its secondary term by continuous produc-
tion from the Ridge tract until 1997. In 1997, Ridge offered to purchase
the Guinn tract in order to complete secondary recovery efforts by a
waterflood. Guinn rejected this offer, leading Ridge to seek the property
by other means. Intending to re-lease both tracts from the lessor, Ridge
intentionally and voluntarily ceased production on the Ridge tract for
72. Id. at 249-50.
73. Id. at 254-55.
74. Id. at 257.
75. Id. at 258.
76. Id. at 260.
77. 148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004).
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ninety days in order to terminate the 1937 lease. During the ninety-day
cessation of production, Ridge wrote a letter to the lessor explaining its
plan to re-lease the Guinn tract. In addition, Ridge voluntarily continued
to pay royalties to the lessor during the stoppage. Ridge then obtained a
new lease. 78
The issue was whether the 1937 lease remained in effect as to the
Guinn tract. It was uncontroverted that production from any one tract
will ordinarily continue the entire lease in effect as to all tracts under a
single lease. Ridge, however, contended that production ceased and the
1937 lease terminated either when production from the Ridge tract
ceased, or when Ridge executed new leases with the owners with the pos-
sibility of reverter of the mineral interest in the Ridge tract. Guinn coun-
tered by contending that the lease was continued in effect by the TCOP
doctrine. 79
The court held as follows:
We agree with the court of appeals in the case before us today that,
absent any language in a lease to the contrary, the temporary cessa-
tion of production doctrine applies when a lease covering more than
one tract or interest is held by production from a well operated by a
partial assignee of the lessee's rights.
80
The court then turned to the central issue remaining in the case, which
was to determine whether there was in fact a temporary cessation of
production.81
Perhaps the most interesting part of the case in the court of appeals
was the court's discussion of the application of the TCOP doctrine to
cessations caused by third parties.82 There has been considerable uncer-
tainty as to the type or cause of cessation that would trigger the TCOP
doctrine. Reviewing the case law generally, the court concluded that the
inquiry ought to be focused on the operator's intent with respect to re-
storing production, rather than the cause of the stoppage. 83 The court
concluded that the doctrine is not limited to involuntary cessations or to
physical or mechanical causes.84 The only fair and just rule is to hold that
the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation is for an unrea-
sonable length of time.85
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed many of the TCOP cases and then
adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals and went out of its way to
clarify that the cause of the cessation was not the critical question. The
court held the following:
78. Id. at 147-48; see Guinn Invs., Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co., 73 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2002), rev'd, 148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004).
79. Ridge Oil Co., 148 S.W.3d at 149-50.
80. Id. at 151 (citing Guinn Invs., Inc., 73 S.W.3d at 531).
81. Id.
82. Guinn Invs., Inc., 73 S.W.3d at 533-34 n.4.
83. Id. at 533.
84. Id.
85. Id. n.4 (citing Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 762 (Miss. 1960)).
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Accordingly, although decisions at times have said that the tempo-
rary cessation of production doctrine applies when there is "sudden
stoppage of the well or some mechanical breakdown of the equip-
ment used in connection therewith, or the like," or that the doctrine
applies when the cause of a cessation of production is "necessarily
unforeseen and unavoidable," the circumstances in which this and
other courts have applied the doctrine have not been so limited. The
court of appeals in the present case correctly concluded that foresee-
ability and avoidability are not essential elements of the [temporary
cessation of production] doctrine.86
The court then ignored Ridge's first theory (that the 1937 lease termi-
nated when Ridge stopped producing) and found Ridge's second theory
to be dispositive: on the date the new lease became effective for the
Ridge tract, there was a permanent cessation of production with respect
to the 1937 lease. 87
The court noted that it was well established that a lease could termi-
nate by surrender, mutual agreement or by signing a new one. When the
owners of the possibility of reverter in the Ridge tract signed a new lease
with Ridge, they effectively terminated the 1937 lease as to the Ridge
tract.88 The mineral owners under the two tracts were apparently not the
same, 9 so the execution of the 1998 Ridge tract lease could not affect the
1937 lease as to the Guinn tract as between Guinn and his lessors. How-
ever, because all production after 1998 was on the 1998 Ridge lease, there
was then a permanent cessation of production from the 1937 lease, which
terminated. 90
Guinn contended that Ridge could not "washout" Guinn's interest in
this manner. The court reviewed the series of cases which have sustained
washout transactions in the context of overriding royalties and applied
the same reasoning to washout Guinn's interest. The court found that
Ridge owed no duty to the owners of the possibility of reverter in the
Guinn tract or to Guinn.91 The opinion is largely based on the surrender
clause, release clause and the assignment clause, but it is also based in
part on the particular habendum clause in the 1937 lease. The lease pro-
vided that production would preserve the lease for so long as there was
production "from said land by the lessee, or as long as operations are be-
ing carried on."' 92 Ridge ceased to be a lessee under the 1937 lease, and
therefore, there was no production by the "lessee," who was then
Guinn.93
86. Ridge Oil Co., 148 S.W.3d at 152 (internal citations omitted). Because the court
ultimately found that the cessation in this case was permanent, not temporary, the discus-
sion and the clarification, while long-awaited, was dicta in this case.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 152-53.
89. Id. at 147.
90. Id. at 153.
91. Id. at 153-55.
92. Id. at 156.
93. Id. at 156-57.
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Guinn also contended that his lease was preserved under that part of
the habendum clause reciting that the lease would be preserved "as long
as operations are being carried on." The court held that production
ceased on March 3, 1998, when Ridge signed the 1998 lease, and none of
Guinn's lessors repudiated Guinn's lease until the first of them signed a
new lease with Ridge on March 28, 1998. The 1937 lease had no thirty,
sixty or ninety-day clause, and the court focused its attention on the
twenty-five day period after production ceased and before the first repu-
diation. The evidence was that Guinn acquired a drilling permit, negoti-
ated surface damages and perhaps drove a wooden stake into the ground
to mark the well site. The court concluded that Guinn did not have to
undertake some activity on the lease every day, but this was virtually no
activity, and it was not enough to raise a fact question as to whether oper-
ations were being carried on under the terms of the lease. 94
Finally, the court rejected Guinn's claims for constructive trust, fraud
and tortious interference. The court stated, "There is no confidential re-
lationship between partial assignees of leasehold interests under a base
lease." 95 There was no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation, and
Ridge and the lessors of the Ridge tract had the right to terminate the
1937 lease as to their interests. 96
The significance of the case is that it clarifies the application of the
TCOP doctrine and focuses the inquiry on the operator's intent with re-
spect to restoring production and the reasonableness of the length of the
cessation. The case is also very important in establishing that there are
virtually no duties owed by one lessee to another holding divided inter-
ests under the same base lease.
Circle X Land & Cattle Co. v. Cago Inc.97 construes the right of lessees
to remove equipment from land covered by a terminated lease. The lease
in question provided for lease termination under the minimum royalty
provision "upon notice from the Lessor." The issue in the case was
whether the trial court erred in allowing 120 days from the date of its
order (declaring the lease had actually terminated), rather than 120 days
from the date the lease terminated, for lessee to remove equipment. The
court held that the operator of the terminated lease no longer had the
right to remove equipment.98 It is well established under the doctrine of
repudiation that a lessee's obligations to perform under the lease are sus-
pended when the lessor claims lease termination.99 The court distin-
guished these precedents as being dependent upon the continuation of
the lease. In Circle X, the lease terminated "upon lessor's notice," the
notice did not itself perpetuate the lease, and the court could not extend
94. Id. at 157-60.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id.
97. Circle X Land & Cattle Co. v. Cago, Inc., No. 10-03-00029-CV, 2004 WL 1418664
(Tex. App.-Waco June 23, 2004, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *1.
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the time for removing equipment.100
If the opinion is broadly construed, it is difficult to imagine any circum-
stances under which the lessee can safely defer removing equipment in
lease termination cases. It will be a rare case that is judicially resolved
before the time to remove equipment under the lease has expired. Per-
haps there is some basis for narrowly construing the case as turning upon
the unusual "lessor notice" provision as clearly triggering the lease termi-
nation clock, rather than the judicial declaration itself, but any suit for
declaratory relief that a lease has terminated is by definition driven by a
dispute as to the legal effect of the underlying facts.
In the case of Grinnell v. Munson,1 1 the court considered the evidence
required to show lease termination when the habendum clause provided
that the term is for so long as there is a well "capable of producing oil
and/or gas in paying quantities." 102 Most habendum clauses in oil and gas
leases in Texas provide that the lease continues as long as oil or gas is
produced in paying quantities. However, the less common clause in the
lease at issue in this case provided that the lease shall continue as long as
a well on the covered land is capable of producing oil and/or gas in paying
quantities.' 0 3
This language is similar to the language recently considered in
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson,10 4 which recited that the lease
would continue as long as gas "is or can be produced."'01 5 The court
stated that "[t]he phrase 'capable of production in paying quantities'
means a well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is turned
'on,' and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or repair."'01 6 In
other words, "a well is capable of production if it is capable of producing
in paying quantities without additional equipment or repairs."'01 7 The
court relied heavily on this precedent and evaluated the proof that was
presented to show lease termination. The evidence presented showed a
complete cessation of production for over eighteen months. However,
there was no evidence to support a finding that the wells on the lease
during the time production ceased were not capable of producing in pay-
ing quantities without additional equipment or repairs if the wells were
turned on.10 8 This finding highlights the different form of proof required
to show lease termination under a "capable of producing" habendum
clause.
100. Id. at *1-2.
101. 137 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
102. Id. at 715.
103. Id.
104. 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
105. Id. at 555.
106. Id. at 558 (citing Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 S.W.2d
427, 433-34 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
107. Id.
108. Grinnell, 137 S.W.3d at 716.
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F. SURFACE RIGHTS
Cook v. Exxon Corp.109 is another in a recent series of cases which
clearly hold that a landowner lacks standing to sue for injury to real prop-
erty when the injury occurred before the landowner acquired the prop-
erty. 110 The facts in Cook are typical. Exxon developed the property,
operated it and sold it between 1930 and 1990. Cook bought the property
in 1994 and then sued Exxon in 2000 for removal of typical oil field
junk-concrete derrick corners, pipes, etc. The court again held that a
successor landowner cannot recover under these circumstances, but this
opinion focused on the narrow question of the distinction between per-
manent and temporary injuries. 1
A temporary injury is different from a permanent injury in that a sub-
sequent purchaser may be personally harmed by the new injury, which
occurs every day the conduct is repeated, as distinguished from a perma-
nent injury which occurred prior to the time the subsequent purchaser
acquired his interest. In evaluating the injury's continuum, the fact-finder
must consider two characteristics of a temporary injury: (1) whether it is
caused by irregular forces; and (2) whether the injury-causing activity can
be easily enjoined. The injury in this case was clearly "permanent" be-
cause it was attributable to a single, past event, and ordering Exxon to
"stop" would accomplish nothing. Moreover, for a temporary injury, the
cause of action accrues when each separate injury occurs and is subject to
the two year statute of limitations. Even if the injury were temporary,
Cook failed to produce any evidence of a new injury that occurred after
he acquired the land, and therefore Cook lacked standing to sue.'1 2
Davis v. Devon Energy Production Co.1 13 reviews the tension between
the dominance of the mineral estate and the accommodation doctrine in a
controversy over a lessee's right to build permanent all-weather caliche
roads through a cotton field. "[T]he lessee of a mineral lease has the
right to use as much of the premises in such a manner as is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the lease.' ' 14 But under the ac-
commodation doctrine, "when there is an existing use of the land's sur-
face which would be precluded or impaired, and when under established
practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the lessee
whereby the minerals can be recovered, the circumstances may require
the adoption of an alternative by the lessee. 11 5 In searching for a stan-
dard by which to gauge the degree of permissible interference, the court
109. 145 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
110. See Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2003, no pet.); Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied):
Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Rich-
ard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 56 SMU L. REV. 1825, 1845 (2003); Richard F.
Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 1219, 1221-22 (2002).
111. Cook, 145 S.W.3d at 779-84.
112. Id. at 782-83.
113. 136 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).




noted that the Supreme Court had stated in Acker v. Guinn that by the
execution of a lease "[i]t is not ordinarily contemplated ... that the utility
of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes will be destroyed or
substantially impaired. ' 116 The Davis court seized on the word "substan-
tially" and held that the accommodation doctrine only applies when "the
impairment experienced by the surface owner is, at the very least, sub-
stantial." 117 Whether the elements necessary to invoke the accommoda-
tion doctrine are established is a question of fact, which, in this case, were
proven. For example, the evidence showed "that in a three month period,
248 proposed well treatments were cancelled because roads did not allow
passage to the wells," while the surface owner's evidence amounted to
little more than a showing that the caliche roads would be an
inconvenience. 118
IV. OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND OPERATIONS
A. OPERATING AGREEMENTS
Cass v. Stephens1 19 is an oil and gas accounting case involving miscon-
duct by an operator by breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The
properties were operated by Frank W. Cass, his son Michael L. Cass and
Cass Oil Company, Inc. There were issues about the identity of the oper-
ator, but the jury ultimately found Frank and Michael generally responsi-
ble for operations. Stephens was a working interest owner who, during
the time period in question, became disabled and eventually died, so that
almost no one was looking after his interests. In summary, the evidence
showed that goods and services provided to wells solely owned by Cass
were charged to the joint account, delivery tickets and invoices were
modified by Cass to conceal the operator's conduct, jointly-owned equip-
ment was moved to solely-owned wells without giving credit to the joint
account, working interest owners were billed multiple times for the same
property, and Cass destroyed documents which showed equipment trans-
fers and sold jointly-owned property to third parties, all of which bene-
fited Cass personally.1 20
The case was filed in 1986 and tried in 1997. There was significant and
systematic discovery abuse by Cass. Stephens proved much of their case
with documents retrieved from Cass's trash by Stephens's private investi-
gator. Over 150,000 documents were retrieved from the trash, including
entire original files, and Cass even tore up and discarded the only signed
copy of the original operating agreement. The court ultimately imposed
sanctions for discovery abuse in an amount of almost $1,000,000.121
116. Id. at 424 (citing Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 419.
119. No. 08-97-00582-CV, 2004 WL 1926411 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 31, 2004, no pet.
h.).
120. Id. at *1-3, *13, *16.
121. Id. at *34, *6.
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Not surprisingly, the jury found against Cass and awarded Stephens
approximately $800,000 in actual damages, $1.4 million in attorney's fees,
$20 million in exemplary damages against Frank Cass individually, and
$20 million more against Frank and Michael Cass, jointly and severally.
Stephens voluntarily remitted all of the exemplary damages except $2.5
million against Frank and $2.5 million against Frank and Michael, jointly
and severally.1 2
2
Frank Cass defended on the basis that the operator was Cass Oil Com-
pany, Inc., not Frank Cass. Frank sent a letter in 1982 on Cass Oil Com-
pany letterhead, which notified the joint interest owners that the
operator, Frank Cass, was changing his name to Cass Oil Company, Inc.
"[T]he Texas Railroad Commission recognized Cass Oil Company, Inc. as
the operator of the wells. ' ' 123 There was no election, no solicitation of
votes, no amendment of the operating agreement, even though Cass
knew and understood the procedure under the operating agreement for
changing operators. The jury rejected Cass' theory that Stephens had
waived an election to select a successor operator. The "change-of-name"
letter provided some evidence, but was not conclusive on the issue of
waiver, and Railroad Commission action is not conclusive as to matters
between the parties to the operating agreement. Therefore, Frank Cass
remained the operator as between the parties to the operating
agreement. 124
The court also affirmed the jury's finding that Frank Cass was liable as
operator under the alter ego theory.125 When there is such unity between
a corporation and an individual that the corporation ceases to be separate
and when holding only the corporation liable would promote injustice,
the individual may also be held liable.
In order to hold a shareholder liable for a corporation's actions, Ar-
ticle 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporations Act12 6 requires a plain-
tiff to prove that the shareholder caused the corporation to be used
for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on
the plaintiff primarily for the direct benefit of the shareholder.
127
The court rejected Cass' defense that there was no finding of actual
fraud, relying upon a jury instruction to support a finding by implication.
More importantly, the court found that the jury's separate finding of
common-law fraud by misrepresentation was enough to support disregard
of the corporate entity. 12 8
The jury found both Frank and Michael Cass liable for conversion
based on their transfers of jointly-owned equipment from the jointly-op-
erated wells to the solely-owned wells. Cass defended principally on the
122. Id. at *5-6.
123. Id. at *11.
124. Id. at *11-12.
125. Id. at *14.
126. See TEX. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21, § A (Vernon 2003).




basis that the claim was for breach of contract, not conversion. The dis-
tinction was significant because breach of contract would not support ex-
emplary damages or personal liability. The court held that
notwithstanding that the COPAS accounting procedures authorized the
operator to move jointly-owned equipment between wells, the evidence
was more than sufficient to justify the jury's conclusion that the failure to
account was not an accounting error, but intentionally done to benefit
Cass. Moreover, the pattern of deception was so pervasive that it sup-
ported a claim for conversion, not merely a breach of contract. 12 9
Michael Cass defended on the additional ground that he should not be
personally liable because he was not the operator. "A corporate officer
or agent is always primarily liable for his own torts," and an employee
may be held individually liable for an employer's tortious acts if he know-
ingly participates in the conduct or has knowledge of the tortious con-
duct, either actual or constructive. 130 "Instigating, aiding or abetting the
wrongdoing constitutes participation," and "the employee or agent may
be held liable regardless of whether he receives any personal benefit from
the tortious act."' 131 The record contained evidence of Michael Cass' ini-
tials approving equipment transfers, which was sufficient to hold him per-
sonally liable for conversion. 132
For purposes of exemplary damages and personal liability, it was im-
portant to distinguish between the claims and damages for breach of con-
tract and the claims and damages for torts. Stephens categorized the
overcharges and charges not authorized as breach of contract, charges
related to the solely-owned wells and for property already owned by the
joint account as fraud, and removal of jointly-owned property as conver-
sion. The court confirmed these distinctions as appropriate. 133
However, only the tort claims would support exemplary damages, and
the damages on the tort claims were only a part of the judgment. The
court reviewed the constitutional standards applicable for exemplary
damages and found that the circumstances would justify exemplary dam-
ages in an amount of three times actuals for the tort claims. Therefore,
the exemplary damages for fraud awarded against Frank were reduced to
$300,000, and the exemplary damages for conversion awarded against
Frank and Michael, jointly and severally, were reduced to $300,000.134
Eland Energy, Inc. v. Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. 135 construes the obliga-
tion of an assignor to pay the operator a share of the operator-incurred
costs and expenses after the assignor assigns all its working interest to
another. Seagull was the operator of an offshore well. Eland acquired a
working interest in the lease under an assignment in which Eland une-
129. Id. at *15-16.
130. Id. at *16.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *17.
133. Id. at *22-24.
134. Id. at *28-33.
135. 135 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. filed).
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quivocably assumed its proportionate part of liability under the operating
agreement. Eland later sold its interest to Nor-Tex at auction for $500.
After Nor-Tex filed for bankruptcy, Seagull sought to recover against
Nor-Tex's assignor, Eland, for an unpaid plugging liability of $268,418.136
Eland did not contest its original assumption of liability under the op-
erating agreement, but contended that as an assignor, Eland had no con-
tinuing liability. The appellate court agreed with Eland. The operating
agreement imposed liability for costs based on each owner's participating
interest, which was in turn based on ownership in the lease. After Eland
assigned all its interest in the lease to Nor-Tex, it had no ownership in the
lease and therefore no participating interest. The unambiguous language
of the operating agreement did not require Eland to reimburse Seagull
for costs or expenses incurred after Eland made its assignment. 137 Oper-
ators who wish to impose restrictions on a party's ability to assign inter-
ests only to financially responsible parties must be careful to expressly
include such restrictions in the operating agreement.
Long Trusts v. Griffin1 38 holds that investors/plaintiffs in gas leases pur-
suant to letter agreements with lease owners/defendants owned a right to
assign their interests in gas wells, rather than having the owner simply
crediting their interest in the wells. Some of the letter agreements en-
tered into provided that once investors complied with the provisions of
the letter agreement, the lease owners would "assign or credit" the inter-
est to the investors. Defendants contended that they had no obligation to
assign the interest, but could opt to "simply credit the plaintiff with such
interest. 1 39 The letter agreements entered into by investors and lease-
holders provided that participants "shall" own their undivided interests in
the working interest of the wells. Assignment was necessary to have in-
vestors' ownership rights reflected in the deed records. Thus, the court
held the investors had the option of taking an assignment or allowing
defendants to credit them with their interests. 140
Defendants also contended that plaintiffs were required to bring an
action for trespass to try title, and that their failure to do so was fatal to
their case. In Texas, interests in oil and gas are real property. The letter
agreements were, in effect, "contracts for the sale of interests in real
property. 1 41 As such, the letter agreements could be enforced by spe-
cific performance and it was not necessary for plaintiffs to bring a tres-
pass to try title action for recovery.142
Defendants also challenged the trial court's order requiring them to
continue marketing plaintiffs' share of the production. The letter agree-
ments gave defendants the right to market plaintiffs' share of production,
136. Id. at 124.
137. Id. at 129.
138. 144 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. filed).
139. Id. at 106.
140. Id.




but also gave defendants the right to discontinue marketing plaintiffs'
production at any time on thirty days notice. The trial court held that
because defendants had engaged in a course of action for more than
twenty years, they were now estopped from discontinuing the marketing
of plaintiffs' share of production. On appeal, the court concluded that
defendants had a contractual right to terminate the marketing of plain-
tiffs' share of production and that defendants were not estopped from
availing themselves of this contractual right. 143
Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Texas & New Mexico, Inc.144 holds that
non-operators have no direct or vicarious liability for the conduct of the
operator, "operator's drilling operations, conversion, trespass, selling and
marketing gas, drainage, development and pooling, accounting, unpaid
royalties and unjust enrichment claims. ' 145 Mulvey owned various min-
eral interests and complained of the conduct of the operators Pecos and
Bay Rock, primarily relating to his right to be paid certain royalties. Mul-
vey added a variety of other defendants due to their alleged vicarious and
direct liability for the violations of his right to be paid from two wells. All
the defendants, except Pecos and Bay Rock, filed a motion for summary
judgment as to the claims of direct and vicarious liability for the acts of
the operator, which was granted. 146
There was no allegation that the defendants, "as non-operators and
overriding royalty interest owners, ever personally or directly, drilled the
wells, operated the wells, produced the wells, sold production, entered
into contracts, or carried out any other act that Mulvey claimed was done
in violation of his rights. ' 147 The only question remaining was the alleged
liability of the non-operators for the actions of operators Pecos and Bay
Rock.148 Mulvey contended that the non-operators were vicariously lia-
ble for the acts and omissions of the operators by their "authorization"
and "ratification" of the purportedly illegal acts of the operators. How-
ever, these are concepts that are only relevant to determining whether an
agency relationship exists, and Mulvey failed to allege agency. The court
held that the non-operator who has an overriding royalty interest has an
interest which is not a tangible or real property interest, and the non-
operator "cannot dictate the actions of the operator. '149 It is a non-pos-
sessory interest. In fact, "[i]t is the operator who has the exclusive right
to drill, produce and exploit the minerals, and who also bears the burden
of paying all operating and drilling costs and royalties."1 50
The court went on to state that "the relationship between the operator
and non-operator is purely contractual and therefore dictated by the con-
143. Id. at 110.
144. 147 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
145. Id. at 605.
146. Id. at 599, 605-06.
147. Id. at 605.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 606.
150. Id.
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tract terms, absent some other special relationship created by the par-
ties. ' 151 "The contract in this case states [the following]: Operator shall
have charge of the management, development, and operation of the lands
including [sic] in the Unit Area for the production of oil, gas, and other
minerals therefrom.1 52 Thus, according to the contract, "the non-opera-
tors retained no ability to direct or control the actions of the operators
related to gas production. '1 53
The court held that because Pecos and Bay Rock were not acting as
agents of the non-operators, and because the non-operators had no con-
tractual control over the production of gas or payment of royalties, the
trial court was correct in granting the non-operators' motions for sum-
mary judgment. 154
B. OPERATIONS
Cleere Drilling Co. v. Dominion Exploration & Production, Inc. 155 allo-
cated the risk of loss in a $2,000,000 well blowout case under the standard
form International Association of Drilling Contractors ("IADC") footage
drilling contract, July 1998 revision. Dominion was the operator and Cle-
ere was the drilling contractor. Cleere lost control of the well on the way
down, before reaching the "contract footage depth." "The well eventu-
ally blew out through several surface fissures approximately 600 to 900
linear feet from the hole, spewing salt water, gas, sand and chemically
treated drilling mud on and around the drill site."'1 56 Dominion hired
Boots & Coots to control the well, and Dominion eventually hired an-
other contractor to drill a replacement well. Cleere sued Dominion for
the contract value of the footage drilled, day work after the blowout, and
for certain lost equipment. Dominion sued Cleere for the well-control
costs, cleanup of the surface, restoration of the surface, settlement costs
of landowner damage claims, and the difference (increase) between the
replacement well cost and the contract well cost.157
Cleere did not contest its own negligence, but focused on the allocation
of risk and indemnity provisions of the contract. Cleere's own claims
were dependent upon the contract converting to "day work" status, which
never occurred, so the denial of Cleere's claims was affirmed. 158
As to Dominion's claims,
Subparagraph 18.15 of the Contract addresses all indemnity and re-
lease provisions of the Contract and specifically notes that causation,
including negligence, will not justify disregard of those provisions:





155. 351 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2003).
156. Id. at 644.
157. Id. at 643-44.
158. Id. at 645-46.
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it is the intent of parties hereto that all releases, indemnity obliga-
tions and/or liabilities assumed by such parties ... including without
limitation Subparagraphs 18.1 through 18.14 hereof, be without limit
and without regard to the cause or causes thereof (including preex-
isting conditions), . . . breach of contract or the negligence of any
party or parties .... 159
Cleere maintained that the contract allocated to Dominion much of the
damage, irrespective of whether Cleere was negligent or otherwise at
fault.
The district court held that Cleere was liable for its own negligence and
that the "overarching indemnity and release provisions of Subpara-
graph 18.15" (which might otherwise transfer that liability to Dominion)
failed because the contract did not satisfy the Texas public policy require-
ment that there be fair notice for release and indemnity provisions to be
binding.160 This holding was reversed.161 The doctrine of "fair notice"
requires that a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of its own
negligence must "clearly express" that intent and the release and indem-
nity provisions must be "conspicuous." Dominion conceded that the in-
tent was express, but argued that the IADC form failed the
conspicuousness test. The court did not seem very sympathetic to Do-
minion's position, but avoided the whole issue by holding that Dominion
had actual knowledge of the subject provisions of the contract, and there-
fore the fair notice requirements were not applicable. 162 Therefore, the
general transfer of liability for Cleere's negligence from Cleere to Do-
minion was effective.
Under Subparagraph 18.12 of the Contract, responsibility for any dam-
ages arising from "pollution or contamination" that originated below the
"surface of the land" was allocated to Dominion alone. Because Subpar-
agraph 18.15 provides that Dominion's responsibility for such damages to
the surface is not negated by Cleere's having caused the blowout that
resulted in the deposit of the materials on the surface, Cleere could be
held responsible only if the materials did not amount to either pollution
or contamination. 163
The district court's holding that the materials were not pollution or
contamination was reversed.164 The court had never before considered
the meaning of pollution or contamination in the context of oil and gas
drilling contracts. It cited with approval definitions found in Black's Law
Dictionary and concluded that pollution is "[c]ontamination of the envi-
ronment by a variety of sources including, but not limited to hazardous
159. Id. at 647.
160. Id. at 646.
161. Id. at 647.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 650.
164. Id. at 657.
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substances, organic wastes and toxic chemicals," 165 while contamination
is a "[c]ondition of impurity resulting from mixture or contact with for-
eign substance. 1 66 Thus, "all pollution is contamination, but not all con-
tamination is pollution. '167
Dominion argued that the substances in question were "relatively be-
nign and not environmental threats. ' 168 The court conceded arguendo
that the materials might not be pollution, but the Contract was in the
disjunctive (pollution or contamination), and the substances were clearly
contamination. 169 Dominion built dikes, worked twenty-four hours a
day, removed 3,900 barrels of waste fluids, and paid for surface damages.
Dominion could not now argue that there was no contamination. Thus,
because the risk of loss was contractually on Dominion, and the damage
to the surface was contamination, Dominion lost approximately
$1,000,000 of its judgment on appeal (all sums related to the clean up,
restoration of the surface, and surface damage claims). Dominion was
given an opportunity on remand to prove up any of such damages which
were not caused by the contamination. 170
The court affirmed that Cleere was liable for the approximately
$850,000 Dominion expended in well control costs and the cost differen-
tial for the replacement well over the contract cost. However, because
Dominion failed to present any evidence on the reasonableness and ne-
cessity of the amounts actually expended by Dominion, the court also
remanded for further fact findings on the issues of reasonableness and
necessity1 71
V. SEISMIC
In Villareal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc.,172 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals determined Texas law requires actual physical entry or injury to
the surface estate lying above the mineral estate in order to sustain a
claim of geophysical trespass. Villareal owned a mineral estate. Grant
conducted seismic surveys using three-dimensional technology across
three counties, including acreage near Villareal. While conducting the
surveys, "Grant obtained permission to conduct survey operations from
over 2,100 surface and mineral estate owners. 1 73 Grant was unable to
obtain permission from everyone within the survey and did not obtain
permission from Villareal. "In order to avoid trespassing on approxi-
mately 125 tracts where permits were not originally obtained, including
165. Id. at 651 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis
added)).
166. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (6th ed. 1990)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 650.
169. Id. at 651.
170. Id. at 653-55.
171. Id. at 655-56.
172. 136 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 267.
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the Villareal property, Grant reconfigured the survey.' 1 74 Grant placed
shot and receiver points only on permitted tracts. Thus, Grant never tres-
passed on the surface of the estate above the Villareal mineral estate, and
Grant contended it never intentionally obtained unpermitted data from
the subsurface of the Villareal property. 175
Villareal filed suit against Grant contending that data was obtained
from the mineral estate without first obtaining Villareal's permission to
conduct seismic testing on the Villareal mineral estate. Villareal filed
claims for geophysical trespass, assumpsit in lieu of geophysical trespass
(reasonable value of the use and occupation of the land in lieu of actual
damages), and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Grant on all of the claims. The San Antonio Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 176
The court of appeals noted that trespass includes subsurface trespass in
the oil and gas context. However, based upon interpretation of prece-
dent, the court held that lack of physical invasion or injury precluded
both trespass and assumpsit claims. 177 Because a trespass did not occur
under current Texas law, Grant also did not wrongfully secure a benefit
nor did Grant "passively receive one which would have been unconscion-
able to retain."'1 78 Therefore, Grant was not unjustly enriched. Although
the court was not happy with existing precedents, it confirmed that the
law in Texas continues to be that a geophysical trespass will not be action-
able unless there is a surface injury or trespass.179
VI. MARKETING
Aurora Natural Gas, L.L.C. v. Duke Energy Trading & Marketing.,
L.L.C.180 reviewed the priority of liens and rights to proceeds from gas
production under the unique Texas approach to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("Article 9"1).181 Because the first payment for gas
production generally does not occur until late in the month following the
month of production, it is inevitable that when an operator files for bank-
ruptcy, one to three months of production will have gone down the pipe
with no payment to the producer. Because the debt to the producer is
"unsecured," the producer would ordinarily fall into the class of un-
secured creditors with little hope of recovery. To protect the producer
against this result, Texas has adopted provisions in its version of Article 9




177. Id. at 268-70.
178. Id. at 270.
179. Id. (stating that "[a]lthough it appears that Texas law regarding geophysical tres-
pass has not kept pace with technology, as an intermediate court, we must follow estab-
lished precedent").
180. 312 B.R. 318 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
181. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.01-9.709 (Vernon 2002).
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to the unpaid production proceeds. 182
Texas begins by defining "first purchaser" in section 9.343(r)(3) 183 in
terms that are broadly effective to capture: (1) the purchaser paying the
producer, or (2) the operator who is collecting all the proceeds of produc-
tion from the purchaser under a "one hundred percent indemnifying" di-
vision order and then paying the producer.184 Under the facts of this
case, Edge Petroleum Operating Company ("Edge") produced natural
gas and sold it to various companies and affiliates ("Aurora"), who even-
tually filed for protection in bankruptcy. As Edge produced the gas, Au-
rora immediately commingled Edge's gas with other gas and sold it to
Duke Energy Trading and Marketing, L.L.C. ("Duke"). Duke immedi-
ately sold the gas it purchased from Aurora to other purchasers; the gas
was used and no longer existed at the time Aurora filed for bankruptcy.
Edge did not file a claim against the debtor, Aurora, but instead pursued
a claim directly against Duke. 185
Edge sued Duke to enforce its security interest under section 9.343186
and for conversion. Texas's version of Article 9, section 9.343 generally
grants a security interest in favor of the producer to secure payment of
the purchase price by the first purchaser, even though the producer does
not have a formal security agreement on file and the producer does not
have possession of the collateral (gas). 187 The security interest extends to
proceeds. Article 9 provides that "[t]he act of the first purchaser in sign-
ing an agreement to purchase oil or gas production, in issuing a division
order, or in making any other voluntary communication to the interest
owner... recognizing the interest owner's right operates as an authenti-
cation of a security agreement. .".."188 Duke and Aurora contended that
Aurora "did not sign an agreement to purchase gas, issue a division order
or make any other voluntary communication" to Edge recognizing Edge's
right.' 89
Edge sold its gas to Aurora's marketing affiliate, who, in turn, entered
into a standard Gas Industry Standards Board ("GISB") base contract.
Aurora ordered gas deliveries from its marketing affiliate on GISB trans-
action confirmation forms. "Neither the base contract nor the confirma-
tion forms mention[ed] Edge."'190 The court held that the statute
182. Id. § 9.343(a) (Vernon 2002).
183. Id. § 9.343(r)(3) (Vernon 2002) provides, in part, that a first purchaser is
the first person that purchases oil or gas production from an operator or
interest owner after the production is severed, or an operator that receives
production proceeds from a third-party purchaser who acts in good faith
under a division order or other agreement authenticated by the operator
under which the operator collects proceeds of production on behalf of other
interest owners.
184. Id. § 9.343(r)(3).
185. Aurora Natural Gas, 312 B.R. at 320-22.
186. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 9.343 (Vernon 2002).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 9.343(a).
189. Aurora Natural Gas, 312 B.R. at 323.
190. Id. at 323-24.
2005] 1031
SMU LAW REVIEW
provides three alternative methods to trigger the security agreement au-
thentication: (1) an agreement to purchase gas production; (2) division
orders; or (3) a communication recognizing the interest owner's right. 191
Issuing a division order did not apply in this case, and a New York federal
district court had recently held that the GISB base contract and confirma-
tion forms do not constitute a voluntary communication to the interest
owner under the statute.' 92
The court carefully avoided the third alternative and focused on "a
signed agreement to purchase gas production." 193 The court held that the
base contract and the confirmation forms implicitly communicate an ac-
knowledgment of the purchase of gas with an interest owner. Therefore,
Edge did perfect a security interest in the gas sold.
194
Section 9.343(m)195 also provides certain protections for secondary
purchasers (in this case, Duke). The secondary purchaser is protected if
the secondary purchaser: (1) buys in the ordinary course of business; (2)
obtains the interest owner's consent to transfer free from lien; (3) makes
sure the interest owner (or operator) is paid; or (4) any disputed amount
is withheld.' 96 Defenses two, three, and four were not applicable in this
case. There was also a dispute between Aurora and Duke as to whether
Duke actually paid for the gas, and that dispute was subject to a pending
adversary proceeding. Therefore, Duke could not automatically prevail
in the Aurora Natural Gas case based upon purchase in the "ordinary
course of business," because "payment" was yet to be determined. The
court did hold that Edge's perfected security interest would attach to ei-
ther the judgment Aurora ultimately obtained against Duke for unpaid
gas, or to the proceeds owned or received by Aurora from Duke as pay-
ment for the gas.1 9 7 Because Edge had not obtained relief from the auto-
matic stay in bankruptcy under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,
198
Edge could not pursue the collection effort directly against Duke.' 99 As-
suming Edge did get relief from the automatic stay and proceeded against
Duke, the court held that the reach of the statutory lien would be gov-
erned by whether the sale was in the "ordinary course of business." That
fact issue required a trial.2°°
Edge also claimed that it could pursue an independent claim for con-
version against Duke. The court noted that:
[U]nder Texas law, conversion is established by proving ... (1) the
plaintiff owned, had legal possession of, or was entitled to possession
of the property; (2) defendant assumed and exercised dominion and
191. Id. at 324.
192. Id. (citing In re Enron, 302 B.R. 455, 461-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.343(m) (Vernon 2002).
196. Id.
197. Aurora Natural Gas, 312 B.R. at 326.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
199. Aurora Natural Gas, 312 B.R. at 326.
200. Id. at 327.
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control over the property in an unlawful and unauthorized manner;
and (3) defendant refused plaintiff's demand for the return of the
property. 201
Because Edge impliedly consented to the transfer to Duke and because
Duke purchased and sold the gas in accordance with the usual industry
practice, the court held that this was a collection action and not an appro-
priate case for conversion. Edge did not have a right to possession of the
gas when Duke purchased and sold it; Duke lawfully assumed control
over the gas and sold it in a lawful manner, and Edge never demanded
possession (return) of the gas. Rather, Edge just wanted to collect.202
VII. RAILROAD COMMISSION
SWEPI, L.P. v. Camden Resources, Inc. 203 holds that a Railroad Com-
mission finding that SWEPI ("Shell") "failed to show probable cause to
suspect" that a well drilled by Camden was not drilled in compliance with
Railroad Commission Rules did not preclude a suit by Shell against Cam-
den for trespass and conversion.204 Shell sought to prove in this litigation
for sub-surface trespass and conversion that Camden's well was bottomed
on Shell's tract. Shell was awarded no administrative relief in the parallel
Railroad Commission proceeding, but the court refused to find that Shell
was barred from seeking a judicial remedy by either collateral estoppel or
the Rule of Capture.20 5
Collateral estoppel did not bar Shell from proceeding because the Rail-
road Commission "does not have jurisdiction over inherently judicial ac-
tions, such as those for trespass and conversion. '206 Camden also
contended that because its well complied with Railroad Commission rules
and regulations, Camden was entitled to all of the production from the
well under the Rule of Capture. "The 'rule of capture' is a well estab-
lished doctrine in Texas which holds that a landowner is entitled to pro-
duce the oil and gas in place beneath his land, as well as oil and gas that
settles beneath his land as the result of physical conditions and natural
laws relating to the migratory nature of oil and gas."'207 Nevertheless, the
Rule of Capture is limited to the production of oil and gas that is legally
recovered. 208
Pantera Energy Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas209 considered the
effect on pending applications of amendments to Railroad Commission
201. Id. at 328.
202. Id.
203. 139 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
204. Id. at 339-40.
205. Id. at 335-36, 340-42 (internal quotations omitted).
206. Id. at 339.
207. Id. at 341.
208. Id.
209. 150 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
20051 1033
SMU LAW REVIEW
Rule 38(d)(3) 210 governing dissolution of pooled units. Special Field
Rules adopted for the Panhandle, West Field by the Commission in 1948
provided for a density pattern of 640 acres in the field. Pantera con-
trolled more than 150 separate tracts that had been pooled for almost
sixty years to form forty-eight units on which forty-eight wells had been
drilled. In December 2000 and September 2001, Pantera filed forty-eight
applications to dissolve the formerly pooled units into their 150 compo-
nent parts pursuant to Former Rule 38(d)(3). Pantera contended that the
last sentence in Former Rule 38(d)(3) required the Commission to grant
its applications without deliberation, "[i]f written waivers are filed or if a
protest is not filed within the time set forth in the notice of application,
the application will be granted administratively.
211
If the application was granted, "each substandard-sized tract would be-
come a 'legal subdivision' on which one well could be drilled. '212 In
other words, by filing the application with a waiver, Pantera could effec-
tively grant itself exceptions to the density rule for the Panhandle, West
Field. 213 Because the Commission determined that the applications were,
in effect, attempts to obtain exceptions to the density provisions without
complying with Commission rules, the Commission refused to proceed
unless Pantera gave notice to offset operators and mineral owners. When
the Commission refused to proceed on Pantera's applications unless and
until Pantera gave notice to offset operators and owners, Pantera
launched three separate legal proceedings which were all addressed in
this consolidated appeal.214
While the applications and legal proceedings were pending, the Com-
mission amended Rule 38(d)(3) to expressly require notice to the "af-
fected persons" (offset operators, etc.) and further provided that the
Commission would grant administrative approval of an application only if
it "determines that granting the application will not result in the circum-
vention of the density restrictions of this section or other Commission
rules .... "215
Pantera sought without success to avoid the effect of the rule change as
to its pending applications. As to whether the rule itself was procedural
or substantive, the court found that the only requirement complained of
was the requirement of notice, and notice provisions have long been con-
sidered procedural. Neither Pantera nor any other litigant has a vested
right in a procedural remedy.216 Pantera argued that the rule was sub-
stantive because the language of the rule ("will be granted") required the
210. See 14 Tex. Reg. 5255 (1989) (former 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.38(d)(3), (h) (Tex.
R.R. Comm'n) [hereinafter former Rule 38(d)(3)]; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.38(d)(3)
(2003) [hereinafter new Rule 38(d)(3)].
211. Pantera Energy Co., 150 S.W.3d at 468-70.
212. Id. at 470 n.5.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 470-71.
215. Id. at 471; see New Rule 38(d)(3).
216. Id. at 472-73.
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Commission to grant the application as filed by Pantera. The court held
that in this instance, the use of the phrase "will be" was, nevertheless,
discretionary with the Commission.217 That is, the words were not
mandatory, but merely directive. Therefore, all the issues in all of
Pantera's proceedings were moot because the rule was always discretion-
ary and is now explicitly discretionary. 218 Pantera argued that the change
in the rules, at least as to Pantera, was arbitrary and capricious because
Pantera's applications were already pending. The court held that there
really was no change as to Pantera because the Commission had, from the
beginning of the dispute, insisted on notice.219 Finally, Pantera argued
that the rule change would deprive Pantera of vested property rights.
Given that "forced pooling does not unconstitutionally interfere with
vested property rights, neither can procedural limits on the unpooling of
a unit. '220
217. Id. at 473.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 475.
220. Id. at 476.
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